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Abstract: I argue that the distinction between comparative concepts and descrip-
tive categories helps language describers and typologists to benefit from each
other because describers are free to set up their own categories, typologists are
free to define their own concepts, comparison need not involve complete sys-
tems, and interlinear translation can be either based on comparative concepts or
descriptive categories. A similar distinction also exists in other disciplines that
deal with cultural concepts.
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There is one type of critical comment on the proposal of conceptually separating
descriptive categories for analysis of particular languages and comparative
concepts for language typology (Haspelmath 2010) that I hear particularly
often: the observation that it was precisely the integration of comparative and
descriptive endeavors that has led to great progress in both fields over the last
few decades. As Volker Gast noted: “Paradoxically, typology has been rather
successful” (Lingtyp discussion, 19 January 2016, see Supplementary Online
Materials). It seems that the publication of the Shopen volumes (Shopen (ed.)
1985, 2007) was the most important milestone in this development, and this kind
of typological overview work does not make an effort to emphasize that it is
talking about comparative concepts. On the contrary, it typically presents the
distinctions it draws as potentially relevant for any fieldworker. So why am I
saying that there is a need for a somewhat novel conceptual distinction?
I would say that the two enterprises of description and comparison need to
be separated conceptually, but integrated in practice. Of course, comparative
linguists should take a very close look at the languages they compare, and
describers should continue to pay attention to what is happening in typology
and be inspired by it, or even do it themselves (perhaps on a smaller scale,
looking at various types found in their world region). Description and
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comparison should by all means be mutually beneficial, and I would argue that
the conceptual separation, rather than being an impediment, actually contri-
butes to this goal in a number of ways.
First, the realization that typologists’ comparative concepts are not discov-
eries but instruments for discoveries (unlike chemical elements, which are true
discoveries about what can exist in nature) is liberating for language describers,
because they can set up completely new categories, with completely new labels,
without having to worry whether what they are positing has been found before
in other languages. Of course, often we find phenomena that are similar to
previous findings by our colleagues, but there are also genuine novelties (such
as verbs for ‘and’, Brown & Dryer 2008). And categories that look familiar may
show some strange features. Thus, when we read about a Jussive mood or a
Perlative case in some language, the transparent labels are helpful for getting an
initial idea about the category, but the capitalization reminds us that the nature
of these language-particular categories is not exhausted by the labels. And when
a label is used with several different senses (e.g., “conative”; Vincent 2013), we
need not be worried. This is merely a practical problem (alleviated by the use of
capital letters for language-particular categories), not a theoretical problem.
Second, the realization that comparative concepts are prerequisites for
comparative results, not research results themselves, relieves the typologist of
the burden of having to hit upon the “right” concepts. In the generative
approach, typological comparison is necessarily based on the universal cate-
gories of UG, so a generative linguist works with three unknown elements
simultaneously: the unknown universal categories, the unknown language-
specific analyses, and the unknown cross-linguistic generalizations. This
means that a lot of intuition-based assumptions (sometimes about all three)
have to be made, and the empirical research results cannot be as objective as
they are if the comparative concepts are rigorously defined. Zwicky (1985)
described how generative analyses are more like doctors’ diagnoses, and in
Haspelmath (2015) I point out that definition-based studies are more objective
than necessarily subjective diagnoses. It is true that intuition also plays a role in
the choice of comparative concepts (Lazard 2005), but not in their definition and
in the testing of hypotheses based on them.
Third, if we understand that our category-based comparative concepts
(such as “ergative case” or “serial verb construction”, cf. Haspelmath (2016)
for the latter) are not different in principle from our grammar-external com-
parative concepts (such as nonverbal stimuli in fieldwork experiments, or text
passages in parallel texts, e.g., Wälchli & Cysouw (2012)), it will be easier to
accept that language comparison is necessarily partial. Just as nonverbal
stimuli and parallel text passages can never contain all possible concepts or
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situations, it will never be possible to compare languages with respect to all
their features, and many features that are interesting to compare in some
languages are necessarily uninteresting in many others. By contrast, descrip-
tion must aspire to be complete. Thus, the scopes of comparison and descrip-
tion overlap only partially, and no effort needs to be made to make them
completely congruent. In the Lingtyp discussion, William Croft proposed a
comparative definition of relative clauses that “limit[s] the predicate head of
the modifying proposition to action concepts” (18 January 2016). This yields a
semantic definition that does not include English attributive adjectives, but
that would also exclude English relative clauses like the woman who knows the
answer, thus introducing another incongruence. For typological purposes, this
does not matter, because English relative clauses with non-adjectival non-
action predicates (like know) have no special typological properties, so nothing
is lost. More generally, Nichols & Bickel (2005) advocate “exemplar-based”
definitions of comparative concepts, explicitly acknowledging that typology
can often make do with a small characteristic property, without requiring the
complete facts.
Fourth, the distinction between descriptive categories and comparative
concepts makes us realize that helping readers of example sentences by provid-
ing interlinear glosses can be done in two different ways: by providing render-
ings that approximate the language-particular classes, or by providing
renderings that view the example from a comparative perspective. What is called
“Augmented” or “Aorist” from a language-specific perspective (and glossed AUG
and AOR in a grammar) may well be called “plural” or “past tense” (glossed PL
and PST) in a typological context that glosses over the subtle distinctions
between these notions and employs comparative concepts. Both of these gloss-
ings are correct, and one can choose between them (or even mix them) oppor-
tunistically. Interlinear glosses are not abbreviations of deep analyses, but
reading aids to the reader.
Language describers are sometimes frustrated with typologists because
these may appear to use strange concepts (such as “subject” for Chinese word
order, where it has no place, cf. LaPolla & Poa (2006)), but if it is recognized that
the typologists’ concepts are separate from the descriptive categories, this frus-
tration should disappear. Conversely, typologists are often frustrated with
describers because their grammars do not answer the questions of the typolo-
gists in a neat way and use strange terminology. But grammar writers often have
good reasons for choosing special terms and for describing a phenomenon in an
unexpected place (e.g., describing attributive property words in the chapter on
relative clauses, because they do not behave much differently). Of course, if
grammar writers also have typologist readers in mind and additionally include
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references in appropriate places, this is even better, but it will never be possible
to anticipate all questions that a typologist might have.
The distinction between comparative concepts and descriptive categories
may be less prominent in other disciplines, but at least in structuralist anthro-
pology, the idea that each society needs to be described in its own terms has
been important since Boas’s times, and Pike’s distinction between emic (culture-
specific) and etic (outsider) concepts is apparently better known in anthropology
than in linguistics. Clearly, a special set of comparative concepts must be used
in comparative anthropology (e.g., in studies of political organization such as
Currie et al. (2010), where bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states are distinguished,
based on much earlier ethnographic work). Why does the distinction seem
controversial in our field? Perhaps the grammatical concepts of linguistics
have had more influence on typologists simply because the grammatical systems
are so compelling (thus, nobody could doubt the wisdom of describing Russian
by means of language-specific categories such as Dative case or Perfective
aspect). Grammatical terminology has long been carried over from one language
to the next (Latin to German, English to Japanese, and so on), with smaller or
greater adjustments, so it has long seemed to linguists that they are using the
same categories that are used in description also for comparison. But upon
further reflection, when taking the perspective of a larger number of languages,
it becomes clear quickly that language-particular notions do not work for
comparison. Greenberg (1963) knew well that “we are essentially using semantic
notions” (rather than language-particular syntactic categories) when comparing
the orders of major clause constituents, and likewise Swadesh’s list of 100
meanings could not possibly refer to meanings that are equally relevant for
comparison (Swadesh’s goal) and description.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Susanne Maria Michaelis and Edith
Moravcsik for discussion and for comments on this paper.
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